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Introduction 
This paper provides a number of perspectives on poverty in Europe and its trends over time, 
drawing heavily on the work of Tony Atkinson. Indeed, the paper is intended as homage to Tony, a 
true European and internationalist who was dedicated to reducing poverty everywhere. 
Figure 1 displays the covers of a selection of Tony’s works about income distribution, poverty and 
social inclusion in Europe, reminding us of how much definitive work he undertook in this field over 
several decades. It really is only a selection; Tony’s many articles and other research outputs are 
not shown. For more extensive overviews of Tony’s work, see inter alia Aaberge et al. (2018) and 
Jenkins (2017). 
Figure 1. Tony Atkinson’s works on poverty in Europe (selected) 
1992 1998 2002 2007 
2010 2010 2017 2017 
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The first work shown in Figure 1 is Tony’s 1992 study with John Micklewright of the distribution of 
income in Eastern Europe before the Iron Curtain disappeared. This is distinguished by its 
originality (few had examined this topic before) and by its careful assemblage of data from a range 
of sources. Alongside material about earnings inequality are chapters on the distribution of 
household income, issues of measurement, and discussion of poverty and the safety net. Poverty 
in Europe (1998), based on Tony’s 1990 Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures, is an extensive review of how to 
measure poverty in Europe and assess differences across years and countries, the economics of 
poverty, and the political economy of anti-poverty policy in Europe. The 2002 and 2007 books, joint 
with Bea Cantillon, Eric Marlier, and Brian Nolan, on Social Indicators and The EU and Social 
Inclusion are landmark studies in the theory and practice of social indicators. This research forms 
the basis of the extensive set of indicators used by the EU for more than a decade to monitor 
social inclusion and now institutionalised in their Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC). Tony and colleagues’ work develops a clear set of principles related to measurement validity 
and data quality, also acknowledging the practical needs of policy-makers and citizens for 
transparent and timely information.  
The team’s work did not stop with their initial analysis (2002) but also considered at length 
implementation challenges and how to take the EU social inclusion process further forward (the 
2007 volume). This continued with the Net-SILC projects that Tony led with Eric Marlier. Their 2010 
and 2017 edited volumes (the latter co-edited with Ann-Catherine Guio) are extensive collections 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of EU-SILC, as well as the potential for modifications 
and extensions to it. I include Tony’s 2010 Macerata Lecture in Figure 1 for, although it remains an 
unpublished working paper, it stands out as a valuable review of the progress being made to 
reduce poverty and increase social inclusion in Europe, written at the time the EU-2020 indicators 
were being decided upon. Finally, I take the liberty to include the cover of Tony’ 2017 report for the 
World Bank. Although about Monitoring Global Poverty, it brings to a world stage many of the 
issues Tony had considered in the European context, including going beyond defining poverty only 
in monetary terms to include additional indicators, the relationships between globally harmonized 
and national estimates, and careful attention to data requirements and to data quality.  
There are four enduring themes in all of Tony’s work that are also reflected in his work on poverty 
in Europe. First, Tony always believed that the topic of income distribution is an integral part of 
economics. Thus policy about poverty cannot and should not be seen separately from economic 
policy. For example, he has written that ‘[o]ne important argument in favour of a poverty target is 
that it would place anti-poverty policy on the same footing as macro-economic policy’ (1998: 151), 
and:  
We cannot consider anti-poverty policy in isolation from other policies. The scope for 
financing income maintenance depends on macro-economic policy choices, on levels of 
government spending, and on rates of inflation. The use of transfer payments or other 
instruments of anti-poverty policy … in turn have implications for economic policy. Social 
and economic policy are interdependent. This may appear obvious, but it remains the case 
that social policy is often placed in a separate compartment. (Atkinson 1998: 151). 
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Second, Tony emphasised the importance of EU-level institutions and actions for making progress 
against poverty in each Member State. The EU context provided leadership, ‘contextualised 
benchmarking’ and mutual learning across countries. Third, Tony believed strongly in the 
importance of thinking clearly about measurement principles but not in isolation – how these 
relate to policy formulation and monitoring are key and integral issues as well. And that leads to 
the fourth theme: that it is essential for poverty analysis and poverty to get the statistical 
infrastructure right, including data. 
Tony also brought two distinctive personal traits to all his work on poverty analysis and poverty. He 
was an internationalist. Alongside his deep concern and knowledge of the British situation, he was 
a Europhile, very knowledgeable about Europe and he served various European organisations (for 
example he was a member of the Conseil d’Analyse Economique advising the French Prime 
Minister 1997–2001, and of the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board 2009–11). Global 
perspectives have always been there too, not only in his final publications. It was in 1998, not 2017, 
that Tony wrote: ‘as we think about developments in Europe, we should not lose sight of the 
objective of eliminating world poverty, which in my view has precedence’ (1998: 152). Tony’s 
second trait is his progressive and optimistic mind-set when thinking about anti-poverty policy at 
times when it appears that little progress is being made.  
In what follows I elaborate on the Atkinsonian themes that I have drawn attention so far, very much 
following in the footsteps of a giant. I address four topics. Section 2 shows how our capacities to 
monitor in Europe have improved substantially over recent decades. Section 3 illustrates how 
progress on EU poverty reduction has been disappointing and reviews analysis by Tony and others 
why this has been. In Section 4, I argue that conceptual and measurement issues remain, providing 
illustrations related to how we should measure ‘poverty’ and specify policy targets. In the final 
section, I consider the future direction of EU-level anti-poverty actions in the light of the earlier 
discussion, ending by contrasting Tony’s optimistic approach with the pessimistic perspectives 
which are perhaps more prevalent.  
Improvements in monitoring capacity and knowledge 
Designing anti-poverty policies without having an accompanying statistical infrastructure to 
monitor progress is like building a house on sand rather than rock. Statistical monitoring is an 
essential part of a poverty and social inclusion policy agenda. As Tony and colleagues have 
emphasised in the European context, ‘[w]e need to be particularly concerned about the three-way 
linkage between policy, vulnerable groups, and indicators’ (Marlier et al. 2007: 239). Only then can 
we determine what the problems are, who is afflicted, and how social policies affect the problems. 
Frank Vandenbroucke, a Minster in the Belgian Federal Government intimately engaged with the 
substantial increase in statistical monitoring initiatives under the Belgian presidency of the EU in 
the 2000s (and a research student of Tony’s) stresses a similar point: ‘[s]ocial indicators are not … 
a miracle cure for the social problems of the EU, but they constitute a key instrument for defining 
and monitoring policies that are put in place to deal with these problems (Vandenbroucke 2002: x–
xi) Vandenbroucke is also clear about the role that Europe can play collectively: ‘[t]he purpose of
the establishment of a common set of indicators is not a naming and shaming exercise. … The 
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peer review process supports … mutual learning’ (Vandenbroucke 2002: viii). 
 
Table 1 summarises the substantial progress made in the statistical monitoring of poverty and 
social inclusion in Europe over the last four decades. A reference point for the situation 40 years 
ago is provided by Malcolm Sawyer’s (1976) study of income distribution in OECD countries, with 
the cross-national comparative statistics based on compilations from national datasets and, 
controversially in some cases, leading to country ‘league table’ positions that differed from 
national perspectives. Over the 1980s, substantial progress was made in the availability of 
harmonised cross-nationally comparable data and hence statistically robust analysis. The 
Luxembourg Income Study database was in the vanguard and the leading early study based on it is 
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995).  
 
Table 1. Milestones in European statistical monitoring of poverty and social exclusion 
 
Date Initiatives EU Data 
1980s EC Poverty Programmes; major Eurostat symposia 
(1984, 1989) 
Compilations of national 
data sets 
1990s First pan-European data: European Community 
Household Panel 
ECHP, 1994–2001, 14 MS 
2000 Lisbon Council: Open Method of Coordination 
framework with National Action Plans 
 
2001 Atkinson et al. report proposing a common EU-wide 
set of social indicators; adopted shortly thereafter 
 
2000s EU ‘Laeken’ indicators (2001), subsequently refined  
Mid-2000s 
onwards 
Pan-European output-harmonised data: EU-
Statistics on Living Conditions  
EU-SILC; coverage 
reflects EU enlargement 
2010 EU2020 targets include a Social Inclusion objective  
 
There were also European initiatives at the same time. During the 1980s, the European 
Commission funded three Poverty Programmes. Although the programmes were not specifically 
about statistical infrastructure, there were major symposia in 1984 and 1989 that considered 
related issues. The 1990s saw the first pan-European data initiative in the field of income 
distribution, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), with 14 Member States eventually 
participating (with data covering 1994–2001). A key feature was the use of input harmonisation – 
the same survey instrument was fielded in multiple countries.  
 
The next major monitoring milestone was the Lisbon Council of 2000 which established the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) framework. Within the OMC, Member States agree upon common 
objectives for the EU as a whole, and a set of common indicators to assess national and EU 
progress towards these goals, accompanied by National Action Plans which encapsulate the 
country-specific measures for reducing poverty. The issues relating to what those common 
indicators should be was discussed at length in a report by Tony and colleagues (subsequently 
published as Atkinson et al. 2002). They proposed a hierarchy of primary indicators of poverty and 
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social inclusion. These leading indicators were to be supported by secondary indicators providing 
additional detail and covering complementary areas. These were the basis of the ‘Laeken’ 
indicators adopted by the EU in 2001 and subsequently refined.  
 
The next major milestone was the introduction of the new pan-European data sets, the EU-SILC, in 
the mid-2000s. Notably, for the first time, Member States were mandated by law to deliver data to 
the EU. Compared to the ECHP, these data cover many more countries – reflecting EU enlargement 
– but the harmonisation is ex post and so harder to achieve. The social indicators that have to be 
delivered is specified but countries have some discretion about the instruments they use to collect 
and produce (though Eurostat provides guidance). In particular, some countries use administrative 
data registers to collect data, though the majority continue to use household surveys.  
A dramatic change from the 1990s is that the EU-SILC estimates for every indicator are made 
readily available through Eurostat’s Online Database and, in addition, the unit record data from 
which the estimates are derived are much more accessible to academic and other research users 
than ECHP data ever were. Registered users can gain access much more quickly and easily (the 
application process is appropriately thorough but much more timely) and the charges are much 
less prohibitive. (Arguably the difficulties of accessing ECHP unit record data helped sow the 
seeds of the ECHP’s demise: see Jenkins 1999.) Access provides opportunities for the scrutiny of 
official statistics, consideration of alternative definitions, and much other research on related 
topics including e.g. developments such as the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model – in 
which Tony Atkinson played a leading advisory role (Atkinson 2009).  
 
The final monitoring milestone is the agreement of the EU2020 targets in 2010. Alongside four 
targets referring to employment, R&D / innovation, climate change and energy, and education, the 
EU has a fifth target relating to poverty / social exclusion. On the face of it, this is concrete 
evidence of social policy being considered alongside economic policies. I return to consider the 
monitoring of this target (and Tony’s views about it) at the end of this paper. 
 
The substantial improvements in statistical monitoring capacity that have occurred over the last 25 
years are illustrated by a comparison with the situation at the end of the 1980s. The European 
Commission asked Michael O’Higgins and me to undertake a survey of poverty in EU countries 
(O’Higgins and Jenkins 1990). Our brief was to replicate an earlier Commission study providing 
poverty estimates for 1975 and to extend it to 1980 and 1985, all to be done a short deadline. In 
common with the Sawyer (1976) study, we had to rely on national data sources and on country 
correspondents who derived estimates from these following a protocol regarding definitions and 
coverage that we provided them. We did the best we could but there were issues with incomplete 
cross-national comparability of the data, and we had coverage of only 12 EU Member States. The 
data were not always available for precisely the three years we sought, and some data were 
missing altogether. For example for Germany in 1985, we had to derive estimates by projection. 
There was only one headline indicator – the proportion of persons in income poverty (defined as 
living in a household with an equivalized income less than half the contemporary mean). Overall, 
we estimated that the proportion of persons in poverty in the 12 countries considered was around 
12.8% in the mid-1970s (1973/77), was much the same around 1980 (1978/81), and rose by just 
over one percentage point, to 13.9% in the mid-1980s (1984/85). The results were controversial, so 
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much so that the Commission withdrew our report from circulation (without ever providing us with 
a proper explanation). 
 
Nowadays the situation is completely different – estimates are easily accessible and 
uncontroversial. Information about poverty levels and trends for Member States and the EU as a 
whole is readily available from Eurostat’s Online Database. The wealth of information available 
about poverty and social inclusion is living proof of the impact of Atkinson et al.’s (2002) 
pioneering work.  
 
With only nine mouse clicks you can map poverty rates across European countries, with Member 
States categorised according to values for the headline poverty indicator, the proportion of persons 
living in a household with an equivalized disposable income less than 60% of the national 
contemporary median income. The latest estimates at the time of writing refer to 2016. If you 
make the clicks, you will see that the highest poverty rates are in Bulgaria, Romania, and Spain, 
where between one fifth and one quarter of the population is poor. The lowest poverty rates are in 
Finland and Denmark, with rates of around 10%. Although the measure of poverty differs from that 
used by O’Higgins and Jenkins (1990), it appears that poverty rates have remained high stubbornly 
persistent over the last three decades. The next section considers progress on poverty reduction in 
more detail. 
 
Disappointing progress in poverty reduction  
 
Splicing together series of estimates from the ECHP through to 2004 and from EU-SILC thereafter, 
and using a consistent measure of income poverty – living in a household with an equivalized 
disposable income less than 60% of the national contemporary median income – one derives a 
picture of trends from around 1995 through to 2015 for EU15 Member States, with shorter series 
for the 10 new Member States (NMS10) who only joined the enlarged EU in the 2000s. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show trends in poverty rates using the headline indicator for the EU15 and NMS10 
respectively. Within each panel, countries are sorted according to their poverty rate in 2015. The 
dashed vertical line in each of the component charts marks the beginning of EU-SILC, a reminder of 
the change in data source and hence potential discontinuity. The solid vertical line at 2008 marks 
the onset of the financial crisis, otherwise known as the Great Recession.  
  
Among EU15 nations poverty rates changed little over the last two decades. The range from 
highest to lowest rate has remained between 10% and 20%. The trend line for each country is 
relatively flat, and the range of the changes over the period as a whole is around 5 percentage 
points. The disappointing progress is not simply a consequence of the Great Recession: the flat 
trend line is the general rule before 2008 in most cases as well as afterwards. And poverty rates do 
not necessarily rise in the period directly after 2008; indeed there was a small decline in the UK. 
There are some noticeable deviations from the general patterns, however. For example, poverty 
rates rose in both Finland and Sweden between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. Poverty rates 
declined over the mid-2000s in Ireland and also (less noticeably) in Portugal. 
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Among the NMS10, the range in poverty rates is as great as among the EU15 – ranging from 
around 10% in the Czech Republic to nearer 25% in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, 
depending on the year – but a more general upward trend in rates is apparent as well as greater 
year-on-year volatility. It is tempting to attribute these changes to the substantial changes 
associated with post-Soviet era transition but year-on-year changes of several percentage points 
also raise questions about data quality.  
 
Figure 2. Poverty rates (%), EU15, 1995–2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Poverty line = 60% contemporary national median income. Countries sorted by poverty rate in 2016. Source. 
Eurostat Online Database. 
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Figure 3. Poverty rates (%), NMS10, 2000–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Poverty line = 60% contemporary national median income. Countries sorted by poverty rate in 2016. Source. 
Eurostat Online Database. 
 
Why did poverty rates not fall much? 
 
It is useful to answer this question referring first to the period from the 1990s through to the onset 
of the Great Recession and then, second, to the period after this. The first period was marked by 
macro-economic growth, and so the usual expectation would be that poverty rates would also fall. 
Why was this not the case? 
 
Tony Atkinson gave three main reasons in his 2010 Macerata Lecture. The first reason is that 
social inclusion received less priority than economic and employment growth policies over this 
period. He points to the absence of concrete EU targets for poverty and social inclusion which 
meant that ‘from the outset, social objectives appeared less urgent’ (2010: 20). Tony also cites the 
influence of the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok which recommended in November 2004 that 
‘overriding priority be given to economic and employment growth policies (2010: 10–11) and Tony 
argues that this recommendation was reflected in the 2005 Mid-Term Review of Lisbon Agenda. In 
this review, the European Council concluded that it was essential to refocus priorities on growth 
and employment and Tony refers to a ‘down-grading of the social agenda’ (2010: 11). 
 
Tony’s second reason for lack of progress in poverty reduction is related to one of his enduring 
themes. Tony points out that:  
 
The Kok Report assumed that increased employment and growth would lead to 
achievement of the social objectives. This assumption needs to be re-examined. It is 
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reasonable neither to simply assume that the objectives are complementary nor to draw 
conclusions simply from the fact that poverty has not been reduced. It is after all possible 
that employment policy worked in the direction of reducing poverty and that, in the absence 
of the policy, poverty would have increased. (2010: 11).  
 
Characteristically, Tony elaborated on this issue with reference to a model of the labour market, 
highlighting differences in productivity across workers and emphasising the role of the demand 
side of the market as well as the supply side. The ‘level of employment depends on the willingness 
of employers to create jobs’ (2010: 12) and this willingness depends on the costs associated with 
hiring and firing, and also recurrent costs including employer social insurance contributions. 
Raising employment by reducing the reservation wages of workers may not contribute to social 
inclusion objectives if higher employment is associated with, for example, a rise in the number of 
low paid workers (he cites the case of Germany). Tony argues that: 
 
Much of the thrust of labour market reform over the pre-crisis period has been in this 
direction, by reducing the level and coverage of social protection and tightening the 
conditions under which benefits are paid. (2010: 13).  
 
Tony points out with reference to his labour market model that the adverse effects on the poverty 
rate need not arise if alternative policies such as reducing the costs of job creation are employed. 
In this case, the pursuit of the economic and employment policy goal is indeed complementary to 
achievement of the social objective.  
 
Bea Cantillon (2011) helpfully elaborates on these arguments making detailed reference to the 
impact of the shift in European policy orientation from ‘passive’ to ‘activation’ strategies, drawing 
on EU-SILC data for supporting evidence. Her summary view is that: 
 
First, rising employment has benefited workless households only marginally. Consequently 
the number of job-rich households has increased while the number of jobless households 
has remained largely unchanged. Second, poverty among unemployed and workless 
households increased in almost all Member States. Third, new work-related spending – 
which tends to be less pro-poor – has increased, while the generosity of traditional ‘passive’ 
income support declined. … The conclusion must be that an adapted version of the old 
redistributive agenda should again be focal in social policymaking, thereby prioritizing 
adequate minimum income protection and the reinforcement of the redistributive capacity 
of social programmes. (Cantillon 2011: 445. Emphasis in original.) 
 
Tony Atkinson’s third explanation for the lack of marked decline in European poverty rates is what 
‘appears to have been the over-reliance of the Open Method of Co-ordination on national policy 
initiatives’ (2010: 14). The point is that national policy objectives reflect national priorities and that 
a lower national emphasis on the achievement of social objectives leads to less progress on 
poverty reduction. This is where Europe can play a role, Tony believed: ‘a significant reduction in 
European poverty requires concerted European action’ (2010: 14). 
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In sum, there are clear diagnoses of the reasons why European poverty rates failed to decline in the 
period prior to the onset of the Great Recession. What about the period after 2009? Explaining a 
lack of decline is relatively straightforward. The crisis brought with it higher unemployment and 
financial stresses on households. The reaction of many governments was not to introduce 
counter-cyclical policies but, instead, to place emphasis on austerity measures aimed at reducing 
public deficits often with additional cuts in the real value of traditional social protection measures 
and also in-kind services. Impacts on households were less in countries such as Germany which 
implemented short-time working measures. For further discussion, see Jenkins et al. (2011). Put 
differently, and picking up the themes emphasized by Tony Atkinson and Bea Cantillon regarding 
the earlier period, the general thrust of social policymaking – the move towards activation policies 
rather than passive policies – did not change in the later period. 
  
A potential fourth reason for the lack of decline in poverty rates, and perhaps also the absence of 
marked rises in poverty rates as a result of the Great Recession, is the way in which poverty is 
measured. Is the EU’s headline poverty measure the appropriate one, and how does the picture 
look if alternatives are used? I turn to these issues in the next section. Interestingly, Tony did not 
cite the definition of measures as an explanation, though he was clearly very aware of the issues 
and implications of different definitions – the extensive discussion in his 1998 Poverty in Europe 
book is but one illustration of this. 
 
Some conceptual and measurement issues   
 
The EU’s headline poverty indicator refers to household money income and the low-income cut-off 
is characterized in terms of contemporary national living standards (a fraction, 60%, of the median 
income). It is one particular interpretation of the EU Council’s definition of poverty: ‘people are said 
to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them from 
having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live’ (Council of the 
European Union 2004). Poverty today depends on national living standards in the current year; and 
poverty in one European country is assessed without reference to the living standards of another 
country.  
  
The potential problems of using such a ‘relative’ poverty measure are well known (Jenkins et al. 
2013). During macro-economic downturns with effects throughout the income distribution not only 
at the bottom, in particular that reduce median income, it is possible for the headline poverty 
measure to decrease. There may be fewer individuals that have incomes below the cut-off simply 
because the cut-off is lower. Similarly, during macro-economic booms that lead to all-round 
increases in income, including at the median, poverty rates may fall simply because the cut-off has 
increased. And similar questions may be raised about the appropriateness of using the fully 
relative measure to compare poverty across countries with very different average living standards 
(see e.g. Burkhauser 2009). 
  
The question therefore arises of whether our poverty indicators should take account of changes in 
the real living standards of the poor over time or their differences across countries. What if we use 
a more absolute approach to measuring European poverty? In the rest of this section, I consider 
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poverty trends in the case of anchored poverty lines – ones in which the low-income cut-off is set 
as a fraction of a national median in a given year in the past. I also look at how the picture of 
European poverty changes if one moves to a common EU standard rather than a national one. 
Were Europe’s headline poverty indicators to be more absolute in nature, this would bring Europe 
closer to the approach used in the USA – this has a single poverty line for every state of the union, 
and this line is anchored in real income terms to living standards from the turn of the 1960s. 
Observe too that the World Bank’s estimates of global extreme poverty are based on an absolute 
approach. The same poverty line, currently $1.90 per day (in purchasing power parity adjusted 
‘international dollar’ terms), is applied to all countries and regardless of the year being considered. 
At the end of the section, I also look at European poverty patterns using a multiple indicator 
(‘multiple deprivation’) approach and consider the extent to which results are correlated with the 
income-based approaches. 
 
Poverty lines anchored at national values in 2005 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show trends over time in poverty rates for the EU15 and NMS10 Member States, 
respectively, where the poverty line is now 60% of national median income in 2005 (expressed in 
real income terms). The time series are shorter than in Figures 2 and 3: estimates are based on EU-
SILC data only, and are missing for France, Bulgaria, and Romania. With some exceptions, the 
general picture of poverty trends is remarkably similar to the trends in the headline relative 
measure. The trend lines are, as before, remarkably flat, though there is some small decline in 
anchored poverty rates just before the onset of the Great Recession, reflecting the economic 
growth at this time. See for example the cases of Ireland, and many of the NMS.  
 
What is surprising perhaps is that the stalling of economic growth in many EU countries after 
2007/8 did not lead to marked increases in poverty rates in most countries. This was because 
automatic stabilisers kicked in and (in some cases) specific special safety measures were 
deployed (Jenkins et al. 2013). But the exceptions are important. In countries most affected by 
financial crisis and growing unemployment, anchored poverty rates did increase much more 
dramatically – in Portugal, and especially Spain where the rate more than doubled from just below 
10% in around 2010 to over 20% in 2014, and Greece where the rate more than doubled from just 
below 20% in around 2010 to over 40% in 2014.  
 
The general lessons are that trends in anchored poverty rates reflect national business cycles and 
average income growth more closely than do trends in the headline indicator. However, if there is 
little economic growth, trends in the two poverty indicators can be quite similar. Thus it is clear 
that it is not the use of a relative measure rather than an anchored one that is responsible for 
European poverty rates not declining markedly. 
 
A separate issue is whether EU poverty monitoring should be based on nationally-defined 
standards (as now) or should move to some common standard, in particular a line defined with 
reference to the EU as a whole. In terms of the EU Council’s definition (see above), ‘the society in 
which they live’ is interpreted as Europe, not the Member State. According to Tony Atkinson, 
an EU-wide line would represent ‘a significant move towards viewing the European Union as a 
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social entity’ (Atkinson 1998: 29). Even if individual citizens did not subscribe to that view, the use 
of an EU-wide line takes into account that individuals’ sense of exclusion may be based on a pan-
European reference point rather than simply their national context. This makes increasing sense in 
today’s world in which traditional and social media cross borders to reach their audiences. 
 
Figure 4. Anchored poverty rates (%), EU15, 2006–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Estimates are missing for France. Poverty line = 60% of 2005 national median income. Countries are ordered by 
poverty rate in 2016. Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
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Figure 5. Anchored poverty rates (%), NMS10, 2005–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Estimates are missing for Bulgaria, and Romania. Poverty line = 60% of 2005 national median income. Countries 
are ordered by poverty rate in 2016. Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
Because national poverty thresholds differ substantially in real income terms, moving to common 
EU-wide line makes a substantial difference to patterns of European poverty. Figure 6 reveals the 
variation in national poverty lines, expressing each country’s ‘60% of median’ line for a single 
person in 2016 as a percentage of the corresponding line for Germany. (The chart thus also shows 
relativities in median income.) In concrete terms, the single-person poverty line for Germany was 
€12,765 per year, €20,291 in Luxembourg (around 170% of the German line), but only €4,500 in 
Greece (35%), and €1,469 in Romania (only 11.5% of the German line). Put differently, in 2016, a 
single adult in Germany with an income of €10,000 per year would be counted as poor in Germany 
using a 60% of national median poverty line, but non-poor in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and all of 
the NMS10 countries. Moving to an EU-wide line, for example 60% of the EU median in 2016, would 
imply a line lower than Germany’s national line but substantially higher than those in Greece or 
Romania. And this would of course have consequences for who is counted as poor. 
 
Tony Atkinson (1998) – drawing on his presentation to a European Commission conference a 
decade earlier – proposed that the reference point issue could be examined by using as a Member 
State’s poverty line a weighted average (a geometric mean) of the national and EU poverty lines, 
where variations in a parameter  allowed a range of possibilities, from the case of fully national 
lines ( = 0) to a common EU line ( = 1). That is,  
Poverty line for country X = 60%  (median income, X) (1–)  (median income, EU). 
For values of  lying strictly between 0 and 1, poverty trends in a country depend not only economic 
growth (changes in median income) in that country but also economic growth in the EU as a whole. 
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Figure 6. Country-specific ‘60% of contemporary national median’ poverty lines expressed as a  
percentage of Germany’s poverty line, 2016 
 
 
Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS10 countries in black. The poverty lines refer to those 
for a single adult household. Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
Brandolini (2007) was the first to implement Atkinson’s idea using data for 21 European countries 
(for 2000), showing by how much moving towards a common EU line would change the 
composition of the population counted as poor in Europe. See Figure 7 which summarizes his 
estimates. (National and EU-wide lines are each defined as 60% of their respective medians.) As 
one moves from left to right (increasing ), the poverty line gives greater weight to the EU- rather 
than national median. If fully national lines are used, then 14% of the individuals poor in the EU25 in 
2000 were from Eastern Europe but, if a common EU-line is used, the fraction from Eastern Europe 
increases to one-half. Over the same range in , there is little change in the fraction from Southern 
Europe, but the fraction from Continental Europe falls by more than one half, from 34% to 13%. 
 
Goedemé et al. (2017) provide updated estimates, for 2008 and 2014, focusing on the case in 
which the poverty line is 60% of the year-specific EU median (i.e. the case  = 1) and provide more 
country-specific breakdowns. Figure 8 reproduces their estimates. As in Brandolini’s chart, 
employing a fully EU-wide line means that the countries contributing the most individuals to the EU 
poverty population are from Eastern Europe – Poland and Romania in particular. Many countries 
contribute hardly anyone.  
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Figure 7. The regional composition of Europe’s low-income population, by value of , 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes.  = 0: fully national lines.  = 1: common EU line. National and EU-wide lines are each defined as 60% of their 
respective medians. ‘Europe’ is 21 Member States here. Eastern Europe: CZ, EE, HU, PL, SI, SK. Southern Europe: EL, IT, 
PT, ES. Continental Europe: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL. Nordic countries: DK, FI, SE. Calculations are based on ECHP data for 
all countries except Eastern Europe for which LIS data were used. Source. Brandolini (2007: Figure 3.3), redrawn by the 
author. 
 
The country-specific detail highlights the fact that the country composition of the EU’s low-income 
population depends on both the population of each country and the poverty rate for each country. 
Shifting to an EU-wide poverty line raises poverty rates in relatively poor countries (mostly New 
Member States) but this has little effect on the composition of the EU low-income population 
unless the country is relatively large (compare Poland and Romania with Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, for example). At the same time, the shift to an EU-wide poverty line reduces poverty 
rates in relatively rich countries, but a country continues to contribute relative large numbers of 
individuals to the EU total if it has a large population. Look at the cases of Germany, UK, Spain, and 
Italy for instance.  
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Figure 8. The Member State composition of the EU-27’s low-income population (EU-wide  
threshold), EU-SILC 2008–2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The EU-wide poverty lines for 2008 and 2014 are 60 per cent of the year-specific EU-wide median income. The grey 
circles show 2008 estimates and the black diamonds show 2014 estimates. Countries ranked by EU-SILC 2014 values. 
Source: Goedemé et al. (2017: Figure 4), redrawn by the author. 
 
Goedemé et al.’s (2017) estimates of the country-specific poverty rates in 2008 and 2014 based on 
the EU-wide line are shown in Figure 9. The proportion of individuals in the EU27 with an income 
less than 60% of the EU median is around 20% in both years. Virtually all the countries with poverty 
rates less than the EU27 rate are the relatively rich countries of the original EU15; those with rates 
greater than the EU27 rate are the relatively poor New Member States. Poverty rates using the EU-
wide standard fell sharply for Slovakia, Poland and Estonia but rose substantially for Greece. The 
estimates shown in the Figures also remind us that, although France is the second most populous 
country in the EU, it contributes relatively few people to the EU low-income population because its 
poverty rate according to the EU-wide measure is relatively low. The Czech Republic, the third most 
populous country among the NMS, also contributes few people to the EU low-income population 
for the same reason. By contrast, Poland and Romania both have large populations – they are two 
most populous NMS (and ranked 6th and 7th in the EU as a whole) – and relatively high poverty 
rates. 
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Figure 9. Percentage poor, by Member State (EU-wide poverty line), EU-SILC 2008–2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The EU-wide poverty lines for 2008 and 2014 are 60 per cent of the year-specific EU-wide median income. The grey 
circles show 2008 estimates and the black diamonds show 2014 estimates. Countries ranked by EU-SILC 2014 values. 
Source: Goedemé et al. (2017: Figure 2), redrawn by the author.  
 
Use of a common EU-level poverty standard raises uncomfortable challenges for policy. Clearly, 
the more we move towards a common pan-EU poverty threshold, the greater the prevalence of 
poverty that is recorded for the New Member States. This brings back to the issue of the role of EU-
level versus national-level policy initiatives and the nature of the EU’s Open Method of 
Coordination. If the estimates arising from embracing of a common EU-level poverty standard are 
to be taken seriously and to guide policy, then the current reliance on national initiatives needs 
modification. EU-level strategies and coordination are required but development of these requires 
all of the Member States to sign up to them. If part of the solution to poverty problem is more 
transfers from richer EU Member States to poorer ones, then getting that collective agreement may 
be difficult. I return to this tension later on. 
 
Poverty as material deprivation 
 
First, however, I consider the role of a different measurement approach – the material deprivation 
one – to consider how it changes the picture of EU poverty from the income-based approach. The 
idea behind the material deprivation approach is, of course, that poverty is not all (or not at all) 
about a lack of money – and that one should look directly at people’s circumstances. The EU’s 
implementation follows closely the measurement tradition pioneered by Peter Townsend (1979) in 
the UK.  
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The EU currently summarizes material deprivation using 9 indicators. (The basket of indicators is 
currently being modified: see Guio and Marlier 2017 for the background.) The indicators are listed 
in Table 2 and cover the inability to afford items related to food, clothing and shelter (items 1–4), 
social participation (item 5), and possession of durables (items 6–9). There are of course 
important issues about how to summarise data on a dashboard of 9 binary indicators (to which I 
return below). For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the EU’s measure of ‘severe material 
deprivation’ (SMD), which identifies individuals unable to afford four or more items out of the nine. 
 
Table 2. Poverty as material deprivation: 9 binary indicators of inability to afford 
 
Cannot afford:  
1. Pay rent or utility bills 6. Car 
2. Keep home adequately warm 7. Washing machine 
3. Face unexpected expenses 8. Colour TV 
4. Eat meat, fish, or protein equivalent every second day 9. Telephone 
5. Have a week’s holiday away from home  
 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show country-specific estimates of trends in SMD rates for the EU15 and 
NMS10. Among the EU15 the majority of the countries have relatively low SMD rates (around 5 %) 
and rates that have changed little over the decade up to 2016 (apart from a rise in the UK and 
Ireland to 2012 followed by decline). Portugal, Italy, and Greece stand out because their SMD rates 
are around 10% at the start of the period, and increase markedly thereafter, especially in Greece (a 
rate of over 20% in 2016). The NMS10 stand out too, because SMD rates are higher than in EU15 
countries for many of them. The rates are around 5% at the onset of the Great Recession for only 
three countries (EE, CZ, SI), but reach around 45% in Bulgaria in 2010. The rate for Bulgaria is 
around one-third in 2014–2016. Compared to the EU15, there is a more distinct decline in SMD 
rates as the decade progressed.  
 
More generally, it appears that trends over time in countries’ SMD rates tend to be more similar to 
trends in their anchored poverty rates (Figures 4 and 5) than to the trends in their relative poverty 
rates (Figures 2 and 3). Both SMD and anchored poverty measures are reliant on components that 
are not updated over time (the deprivation items and cut-off, and real income poverty line). The 
ranking of countries according to SMD rate is not necessarily the same as the ranking by income 
poverty rate. 
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Figure 10. Severe Material Deprivation (SMD) rates (%), EU15, 2008–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The definition of SMD is explained in the text. Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
Figure 11. Severe Material Deprivation (SMD) rates (%), NMS10, 2008–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The definition of SMD is explained in the text. Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
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Figure 12 shows for 2016 the relationship at the country level between rates of SMD and income 
poverty according to the headline relative measure. The dashed lines show the EU27 averages for 
each measure. If there were a perfect correlation between the two measures, i.e. if they provided 
the same information about the situation of each Member State relative to others, each country 
data point would lie on or close to a straight line fitted through the data points. Clearly this is not 
the case. Although a fitted regression line would have a positive slope, there would be substantial 
variation around the line with dispersion greater at above-average rates of income poverty. This 
description applies regardless of whether the line is fit to the EU15 only, NMS10 only, or all 25 
countries. It appears that although there is much variation across the EU15 countries in relative 
poverty rates, there is relatively little variation in SMD rates aside from outliers such as Portugal, 
Italy and especially Greece with relatively high SMD rates.  
 
Instead there appears to be a closer relationship between the SMD rate and the poverty rates 
based on the common EU-wide standard shown in Figure 10. The set of countries with the ten 
highest SMD rates in 2016 is almost identical with the set in 2014 with the ten highest poverty 
rates based on the common 60%-of-EU-median line. The only difference is that Italy appears in the 
former list but not the latter, and vice versa for Estonia.  
 
Figure 12. Association between rates of SMD and of relative income poverty, 2016 
 
Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS countries in black. Dashed lines show EU27 averages.  
Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
In sum, the material deprivation approach paints a different picture of poverty across Member 
States than does use of the conventional relative poverty measure. (See also Fahey 2007 on this.) 
There are particular features of the material deprivation measure contributing to this. In particular 
the SMD measure is based on a common EU list of items which is applied to each Member State, 
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and over the period under consideration the list of items has not been updated. By contrast the 
headline relative poverty measure is based on national medians and updated when national living 
standards summarised by the median income change.  
 
The apparently closer relationship between SMD rates and income poverty rates based on an EU-
wide standard does not imply that one approach has greater validity than another. Assessments of 
validity are contingent on agreement about the fundamental concepts being measured. Experience 
suggests that it is hard to secure consensus about whether to prioritize relative or absolute income 
measures, and there is enduring debate about the roles of income and material deprivation in 
summarizing poverty. And there are of course many conceptual issues with the multiple 
deprivation approach that I have not considered. These include questions such as the choice of 
indicators and hence dimensions of deprivation, the use of binary versus categorical or continuous 
measures, the choice of deprivation cut-offs in each dimension, and how to count deprivations and 
whether and how to weight them. Many of these issues are considered in the recent literature on 
multidimensional poverty. For pioneering papers, see e.g. Atkinson (2003), Bourguignon and 
Chakravarty (2003), and Alkire and Foster (2011). Alkire et al. (2014) is one of the first papers to 
apply the Alkire-Foster approach to EU-SILC data. 
 
The way forward is not to treat the choice of ‘poverty’ indicator as if it were a binary choice 
between black or white. Instead one should treat the multiple sources of information as 
complements rather than substitutes, and to use all of them as a means to better to describe and 
understand changes in household circumstances. As put by Tony Atkinson and co-authors, 
‘[w]ithout complementing the analysis of cross-sectional and longitudinal income-based indicators 
with that of cross-sectional and longitudinal MD [material deprivation] variables, part of the 
explanation behind these trends would have been missed’ (Atkinson et al. 2017a: 42–43). 
 
If one does emphasize the material deprivation approach, then the policy targeting issues that I 
cited earlier in the context of the EU-wide measures arise again. The countries with the highest 
SMD rates are mainly New Member States and Greece, and there is the political issue of whether – 
or how – this finding might be translated in a greater targeting of EU-level actions to alleviate the 
problems identified in these countries. 
 
There are also other indicators of the changes in living standards that could be employed 
alongside those mentioned so far. For instance, the Eurostat Online Database provides EU-SILC-
based estimates of quantile group shares of total income by year and country. The World Bank and 
OECD are now placing emphasis on concepts such as ‘shared prosperity’ and ‘inclusive growth’ 
respectively. Shared prosperity is commonly summarised in terms of (changes in) the share of 
total income held by the poorest 40%. (For a discussion of interpretations and links with other 
measures, see Ferreira et al. 2018.) Tony Atkinson supported the use of this indicator, but also 
recommended that the real income levels of the poorest 40% should be examined. See Atkinson et 
al. 2017a, especially section 1.4.4) in the European context and Atkinson (2017) in a global 
context. Also not considered here are the relative merits of measuring of living standards in terms 
of expenditure or consumption rather than income. See Atkinson (1994, 2017) for a review of the 
issues, and Serafino and Donkin (2017) for an EU-SILC application employing income, expenditure, 
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and material deprivation measures. 
 
Multiple measures and the EU2020 Social Inclusion target 
 
The issues of whether different measures provide similar information about Member States and 
the circumstances of households within them has arisen again in the context of the EU2020 Social 
Inclusion target. This is because the target refers not only to income poverty and material 
deprivation but also to being in a very low-work intensity household. More precisely, the ‘Fighting 
poverty and social exclusion’ target refers to ‘a least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion’. Monitoring progress is based on comparisons of counts of persons who are: 
(1) at risk of income poverty (measured using 60% of contemporary national median line), or (2) 
severely materially deprived, or (3) living in households with very low work intensity. On the one 
hand, individuals are only counted once in the total even if they are present in more than one of the 
three sub-indicator counts. However, on the other hand, a reduction in headline EU2020 count is 
possible via a reduction in any one of the three dimensions.  
 
Figure 13. Association between percentage with at least one EU2020 problem and percentage  
with all three EU2020 problems, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS countries in black. Dashed lines show EU27 averages. 
Source: Eurostat Online Database. 
 
The EU2020 approach is a ‘counting’ approach to the aggregation of the sub-indicators rather than 
a ‘union’ approach in which the headline indicator requires an individual to be ‘deprived’ on all of 
the dimensions summarized by the sub-indicators (Atkinson 2003). Figure 13 shows that using the 
different approaches leads to different results. It displays for EU Member States in 2016 a plot of 
country percentages of persons with at least one EU2020 problem against the country percentages 
of persons with all three problems. Although the correlation between percentages is positive, the 
relationship is weak. It is stronger among the EU15 than the NMS10 but even so there are clear 
23  Social Policy Working Paper 03-18  
 
outliers such as Belgium and Ireland with relatively high percentages of persons with all three 
problems. Among the NMS there is substantial heterogeneity. Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria each 
have similar percentages of individuals with at least problem (between 35% and 40%), but Greece 
and Bulgaria have markedly higher percentages of individuals with all three problems (between 5% 
and 6% compared with less than 3%). 
 
There are further issues concerning the target which deserve attention. Is the use of three 
indicators official recognition that each indicator picks up different information (the issue raised in 
the previous paragraphs)? Or, more cynically, is the target’s specification simply a politically 
expedient way of avoiding making a decision about what ‘poverty’ really is?  
 
The future direction of EU-level anti-poverty actions 
 
The discussion so far has argued that, substantial progress has been made over the last two to 
three decades in EU-level initiatives in statistical monitoring of poverty and social exclusion and in 
developing an anti-poverty agenda. But at the same time the prevalence of poverty remains 
stubbornly high (and according to a range of measurement approaches). The progress cited has 
always involved a mixture of reliance on EU-level and national-level initiatives relating to, for 
example, the way in which the monitoring indicators are defined. And at the heart of the EU’s 
current approach is the combination of the EU-level Open Method of Coordination regarding higher 
level strategizing, but implementation is centred around national action plans and their policies. In 
this final section, I reflect on how monitoring might develop (nature of indicators, data), whether 
the shape of the anti-poverty strategy should change, and whether we should be pessimistic or 
optimistic about progress. Once again I draw heavily on the work of Tony Atkinson. 
 
Figure 14, summarizing progress towards meeting the EU2020 target, and taken from Atkinson et 
al. (2017a), is the starting point. Year 2008 provides the baseline data for assessing progress 
towards the ’20 million fewer’ target for 2020. Reading upwards from the bottom, the lines show 
the evolution of the numbers of individuals in quasi-jobless household rate (QJ), in severe material 
deprivation (SMD) and at risk of poverty (AROP, calculated using the 60% of contemporary national 
median poverty cut-off). The number at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) is the 
combination of the information about AJ, SMD and AROP using the rules for calculating the 
EU2020 indicator cited in the previous section. The EU2020 target would be achieved if the number 
of persons AROPE in 2008 (115.908 million) fell to 95.908 million or fewer by 2020: look at the line 
with the arrowhead. 
 
The headline result is the lack of progress towards meeting the EU2020 target so far. As of 2016, 
the number of persons AROPE was larger (117.604 million) rather than smaller than the baseline 
number for 2008. The chart also shows that the only sub-indicator of the three that is heading in 
the right direction is the SMD one.  
 
 
 
 
Stephen P. Jenkins  24            
Figure 14. Progress towards the EU social inclusion target, 2005–2015 (in thousands of persons) 
 
 
Note. The chart shows the evolution of the number of persons living in quasi-jobless households (QJ), in severe multiple 
deprivation (SMD), and at risk of income poverty (AROP). AROPE is the combined indicator used to assess progress 
towards the EU2020 target. See main text for details. Source: Atkinson, Guio, and Marlier (2017a: Figure 1.1). 
 
Grounds for pessimism? 
 
A pessimistic reaction about the possibility of progress towards the EU2020 target seems justified 
on the basis of this evidence, especially when one takes into account the changes in the socio-
economic context that may hinder EU-level initiatives and many national ones. I am referring not 
only to the nature of macroeconomic environment (discussed earlier) though clearly it is relevant 
that many policy-makers argue that addressing social problems should take lower priority to 
economic ones in this Austerity Era. It is also that the ‘EU’ itself has changed and continues to 
evolve substantially as a result of enlargement and migration, both internally and from outside the 
EU. There are distinct differences in economic performance across Member States. With the 
nationalistic surge in many Member States, including the Brexit referendum vote in the UK, it would 
seem to be hard to argue that there is sufficient cross-national solidarity for more concerted supra-
national EU-level initiatives in social policy.  
 
Put differently, the prospect of introducing new anti-poverty policies such as an EU-wide basic 
income for children as proposed by Tony Atkinson in his 2010 Macerata Lecture seems infeasible 
in the current climate and so not worth arguing for.  
 
 
 
25  Social Policy Working Paper 03-18  
 
Or grounds for optimism?  
 
Tony Atkinson’s reaction was at odds with the pessimistic view, and he continued to make 
suggestions about what he thought would be fruitful progress on anti-poverty policy measures. In 
the European context, he made several proposals together with co-authors Anne-Catherine Guio 
and Eric Marlier (2017a). They recommend continuing to improve the current monitoring 
infrastructure and the Open Method of Coordination, making a principled case for effective policies 
and policy analysis. They write about increasing (not decreasing) the EU’s ambition – to look 
beyond 2020 for framing EU targets and to draw on the Sustainable Development Goals framework 
(which refer to 2030 targets). The SDGs are now global in scope (about rich countries as well as 
poor ones, unlike the Millennium Development Goals) and incorporate national poverty objectives 
in their targets. This leads Tony and colleagues to suggest, inter alia, that the EU should also add 
indicators of ‘extreme poverty’ and of ‘real income growth of poorest 40%’ to existing EU social 
indicators. They stress that the five EU2020 targets and policies directed at them should not be 
looked at in isolation; economic and social goals and measures need to be looked at together. 
 
Tony and colleagues also give reasons for their proposed strategy:  
 
Faced with such failure [to make good progress towards the EU2020 targets], Europe’s 
leaders may simply decide to throw in the towel, and write off 2010–2020 as a ‘lost 
decade’. The Europe 2020 objective of a reduction of a sixth may simply be pushed 10 
years into the future. Such an outcome would be extremely disappointing to those 
concerned with the social dimension of Europe, and devastating for the millions of Europe’s 
citizens living at risk of poverty or social exclusion. We believe that the SDGs, with their 
greater ambition, should be the basis for setting Europe’s commitment for 2030. Halving 
poverty by 2030 should not be beyond the resources of a rich continent. (Atkinson et al. 
2017a: 46-47.) 
 
Tony’s reactions to the progress relative to the EU2020 benchmarks are further evidence of his 
enduring themes and traits that I referred to in the Introduction. There is persistence in his views 
about the direction of social security policy as well. Tony strongly believed in the social insurance 
model, highlighting problems that arise with a reliance on means-testing, but he was also very 
much open to supplementation through forms of basic income schemes. His 2010 Macerata 
Lecture proposal for an EU-wide basic income for children was predated by consideration of a 
‘participation income’ (a basic income conditional on making an appropriate social contribution, 
which could including caring as well as paid work) in his 1998 Poverty in Europe book. He returned 
to the same idea in his 2015 Inequality. What Can be Done? book addressing financing in great 
detail in order to show that his proposals were feasible. 
 
When I was first thinking about future directions in EU poverty monitoring and policy, I was a 
pessimist of the kind I characterized earlier. But I have changed my mind after re-reading Tony 
Atkinson’s work – something that has happened a lot during my career! I now think that to be 
pessimistic is to be defeatist; to make progress happen, you have to believe, optimistically, that 
progress is possible  just as Tony did. As ever, he puts the case eloquently and persuasively. In 
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the final section of his 2015 book, Tony emphasised that social progress had been made over the 
longer term. He acknowledged contemporary problems, but argued that further progress was 
possible and something we should explicitly aim for: 
 
I have written this book in a positive spirit. I have stressed the importance of looking back 
in time, but I do not believe that we have returned to a world like that when Queen Victoria 
was alive. … It is true that since 1980 we have seen an “Inequality Turn” and that the twenty-
first century brings challenges in terms of ageing of the population and climate change. But 
the solutions to these problems lie within our own hands. If we are willing to use today’s 
greater wealth to address these challenges, there are indeed grounds for optimism. 
(Atkinson 2015: 308.) 
 
Tony will continue to inspire us and influence our work on European poverty and anti-poverty policy 
– and all the other topics he worked on. 
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